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1ABSTRACT 
 
The choice to become a parent, to give a baby up for adoption, or to terminate a 
pregnancy presents a life-altering decision for a minor.  The majority of states require 
minors to engage their parents or legal guardians in their choice to obtain an abortion, but 
not in decisions to give their babies up for adoption or to become parents.  Though the 
Supreme Court has held that parental consent and notification laws do not infringe on a 
minor’s constitutional rights if judicial bypass options are available, the reality of these 
judicial proceedings demonstrates a biased and unworkable legal avenue.  Even the 
Supreme Court acknowledges the difficulty in measuring “maturity,” but has continued to 
affirm “maturity” as the standard judges should use when evaluating minor’s petitions.   
Consequently, judges’ decisions are left largely to their own discretion and have 
resulted in inconsistent determinations of “maturity.”  Due to the significant risk of 
poverty and child abuse associated with teenage parenting, judicial bypass proceedings 
should be objective and look out for the best of the minor.  Not only must minors 
navigate the cumbersome process of appearing before a judge to obtain a judicial waiver, 
they may encounter a judge whose personal beliefs have sealed their fate before they 
have even had their day in court.  Thus, the danger of judicial bias, permitted through the 
unworkable definition of “maturity,” must be eliminated from judicial bypass 
proceedings to protect the reproductive choices of pregnant minors.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By law, minors are generally restricted in their autonomy.  A state may restrict a 
minor’s ability to purchase alcohol,1 obtain a driver’s license,2 enter non-avoidable 
contracts,3 or marry.4 Generally, children under eighteen are not permitted to consent to 
or refuse medical treatment without their parents’ consent.5 In at least one state, school 
administrators must have a parent’s note before they are allowed to apply sunscreen on a 
 
1 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 15658 (West 2005). 
2 CAL. VEH. CODE § 12814.6 (West 2005). 
3 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6700, 6701, 6710 (West 2005). 
4 CAL. FAM. CODE § 302 (West 2005). 
5 FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 5.1 (3d ed. 1998). The 
common law stated that a minor was unable to consent to medical treatment by themselves and, 
with the exception of emergencies or other impractical situations, imposed a requirement on 
doctors to seek the consent of the minor's parent before performing any medical procedures.  
3student.6 Similarly, in the context of abortion, pregnant minors face restrictions on their 
decision-making.  Roe v. Wade may have granted women the legal choice to terminate a 
pregnancy in 1973,7 but pregnant minors have yet to gain complete autonomy over their 
abortion decisions.   
Currently, the majority of states require minors to engage their parents or legal 
guardians in their choice to obtain an abortion.8 The Supreme Court has held that 
parental consent and notification laws do not infringe on a minor’s rights if the minor 
may bypass her parents by obtaining judicial consent.9 Typically, to gain a judicial 
bypass, a pregnant minor must demonstrate either that she possesses the requisite 
maturity to make an independent decision to have an abortion, or that even if she is not 
mature enough to make that decision herself, the desired abortion would be in her best 
interests.  However, the “maturity” requirement of judicial by-pass procedures should be 
dismissed entirely; its application is biased and unworkable.  The measuring of maturity 
is a subjective inquiry and no clear standard exists for judges to follow.  Neither the 
Supreme Court nor state legislatures have provided judges with adequate guidance to 
measure maturity, and even developmental psychologists disagree on which factors 
correctly measure a minor’s maturity.  Since judges must rely on their own ideas of 
“maturity,” judicial bypass evaluations are left primarily to their unfettered discretion.  
Moreover, appellate courts have been deferential to lower court rulings even when no 
reasoning is provided as to why certain factors constitute immaturity. 
 
6 Daniel de Vise, Bill Would Legislate Maryland Students’ Use of Sunscreen, WASH. POST, Mar. 
29, 2005, at B1. 
7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION 
LAWS (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. 
9 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
4In Part I this article will examine the history behind parental consent and 
notification statutes, as well as the current structure of related legal doctrines.  Part II will 
detail the problems and significant dangers of judicial bias posed by using “maturity” to 
evaluate whether a pregnant minor should receive an abortion.  Part III will examine 
other laws granting minors the ability to make other major life decisions without parental 
involvement, such as having a baby, obtaining medical treating during a pregnancy, 
receiving medical treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, or giving a baby up for 
adoption.  Ultimately, this paper will conclude that the maturity requirement should not 
be used in judicial bypass proceedings to determine whether a minor may obtain an 
abortion.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Parental Consent Statutes
In response to the Roe v. Wade decision, many states began to legislate against a 
minor’s right to an abortion by enacting parental consent or notification laws.10 The 
Supreme Court first examined an abortion parental consent statute in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 11 In Danforth, the statute at issue required 
an unmarried minor to obtain written consent from one parent or legal guardian before 
she could obtain an abortion, unless the abortion was necessary to preserve her life.12 
Though noting that states have broader authority to regulate the activities of children than 
 
10 Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Note, When is a Pregnant Minor Mature?  When is an Abortion in Her 
Best Interests?  The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio’s Abortion Parental Notification Law: In 
Re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 909 (1991). 
11 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58 (1976). 
12 Id. 
5those of adults,13 Justice Blackman maintained that “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature 
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.”14 
The Court held that conditioning minors’ access to abortions on parental consent did not 
achieve state interests such as safeguarding the family unit and parental authority.   Thus, 
the Court maintained that any parental interest in the decision of a minor child to have or 
not have an abortion did not outweigh a pregnant minor’s right of privacy in the abortion 
context.15 A state “does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an 
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to 
terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.”16 
Three years later in Bellotti v. Baird, the Court evaluated whether a parental 
consent statute alternatively allowing pregnant minors to obtain a judicial waiver of 
parental consent for “good cause shown” avoided the “absolute, and possibly arbitrary, 
veto” forbidden by Danforth. 17 In Bellotti, the Court found the statute unconstitutional 
because it permitted judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a 
sufficiently mature minor, and it required parental consultation or notification in all 
instances without allowing the minor to receive an independent judicial determination.18 
The Court held that if a state requires a pregnant minor to obtain parental consent from a 
parent before obtaining an abortion, the state must also provide “an alternative procedure 
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”19 A minor could seek judicial 
permission to obtain an abortion, and the judge would determine whether the minor was 
 
13 Id. at 75. 
14 Id. at 74. 
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality decision). 
18 Id. at 651. 
19 Id. at 643. 
6“mature” enough and whether the abortion would be in her best interest.20 Though not 
defining the precise attributes of “maturity” that a minor must possess in order to bypass 
parental consent for an abortion,21 the Court’s principal decision offered four criteria for a 
constitutional bypass provision:  
(i) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes 
that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make the abortion 
decision independently; (ii) allow the minor to bypass the consent 
requirement if she establishes that the abortion would be in her best 
interests; (iii) ensure the minor’s anonymity; and (iv) provide for 
expeditious bypass procedures.22 
Thus, the Court established the judicial bypass and maturity requirements, which have 
been affirmed in several cases after Bellotti.23 
B. Parental Notification Statutes
In Hodgson v. Minnesota, the Court held that a two-parent notification 
requirement was unconstitutional.24 In examining a statute which instituted a 48-hour 
waiting period after notification of both parents,25 the Court held that this defect could be 
saved by the existence of a judicial bypass procedure similar to the alternatives required 
of parental consent statutes.26 In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron 
II), decided on the same day as Hodgson, the Court held that “a bypass procedure that 
will suffice for a consent statute will also suffice for a notice statute.”27 The judicial 
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 643-44 (recognizing maturity is “difficult to define, let alone determine”). 
22 Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44). 
23 See generally City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) 
(statute prohibiting doctors from performing abortions on minors without parental consent found 
unconstitutional because it not provide for judicial consent alternative); Planned Parenthood 
Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (statute requiring evidence of minor’s emotional 
development, intellect, and maturity to be given to juvenile court for minor to obtain judicial 
consent found constitutional). 
24 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1990). 
25 Id. at 422. 
26 Id. at 422-23. 
27 Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 511 (1990). 
7bypass provision allowed judicial consent if parental notice was not in the minor’s best 
interest.28 Though declining to answer whether a parental notification statute must 
include a bypass provision to be constitutional, the Court held that the bypass provision 
satisfied the four Bellotti criteria required for bypass provisions in parental consent 
statutes. 29 The Court held that the parental notification statute a fortiori satisfied any 
criteria that might be required for judicial bypasses of parental notification statutes, and 
was therefore constitutional.   
In Lambert v. Wicklund, the Court examined a parental notification statute which 
provided a judicial bypass where notification was not in the minor’s best interest, but did 
not contain a judicial bypass where an abortion would be in the minor’s best interests.30 
The Court held that a judicial bypass procedure which required a minor to show that 
parental notification was not in her best interests was equivalent to a judicial bypass 
procedure requiring a minor to show that abortion without notification was in her best 
interests.31 
In the recent Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, the 
Supreme Court examined a New Hampshire law requiring minors to obtain the consent of 
at least one parent and wait forty-eight hours before having an abortion.32 Lower courts 
had struck down the law, declaring it unconstitutional because there was no exception for 
medical emergencies.33 Rather than taking the “bluntest remedy,” such as striking down 
 
28 Id. 
29 Lambert, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 297-298. 
32 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, No. 04-1144, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 912, 
at *6 (126 S. Ct. 961 (U.S. 2006)). 
33 Id. at *7. 
8an entire parental notification law, the Court held that other “modest” options are 
available to lower courts.34 According to Justice O’Connor: 
[i]n the case that is before us . . . the lower courts need not have 
invalidated the law wholesale . . . Only a few applications of New 
Hampshire’s parental notification statute would present a constitutional 
problem.  So long as they are faithful to legislative intent, then, in this case 
the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction 
prohibiting the statute’s unconstitutional application.35 
Thus, while a majority agreed that there was a problem with the law, the Court remanded 
the case without creating a remedy.36 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH USING “MATURITY” TO EVALUATE MINORS’ 
PETITIONS FOR ABORTIONS. 
 
A. Current State Statutes Requiring Parental Involvement
Operating under the doctrines set forth in Bellotti v. Baird and its progeny, thirty-
four states currently require some form of parental involvement in a minor’s decision to 
have an abortion.37 All thirty-four states require that the parental involvement have a 
judicial bypass process for minors seeking an abortion.38 Of the remaining states, nine 
have parental consent or notification laws which have been found unconstitutional,39 and 
seven have no laws on the books to prevent minors from obtaining abortions on their 
 
34 Id. at *19. 
35 Id. at *4 
36 Id. at *20. 
37 Guttmacher, supra note 8.  Twenty-one states require one or both parents to consent to the 
procedure, while 12 require that a parent be notified and 1 state requires both parental consent 
and notification. 
38 THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN 
MINORS’ ABORTIONS (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf. 
39 NARAL, PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-
center/in_your_state/who-decides/nationwide-trends/young-women.html (last visited Aug. 29, 
2006).  Parental consent or notification laws in Alaska, California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico have been held unconstitutional. 
9own.40 Since approximately 400,000 minors become pregnant in the United States each 
year,41 courts have often been called upon to evaluate the maturity of minors seeking 
abortions.  Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive national statistics for abortion 
applications from minors since most states do not collect them.42 Available information 
in Michigan reported in 2001 that only 6.69% of all abortions in Michigan were 
performed on minors, and less than 1% of all pregnancies in Michigan ended as a result 
of an abortion obtained by a minor.43 Of that less than 1%, almost 70% of all Michigan 
minors wishing to gain access to abortions did so by discussing it with their parents and 
obtaining approval.44 In Florida, of the nearly 50,000 teenage abortions in Florida in 
2004, only 201 underage girls sought out the courts to obtain an abortion without parental 
involvement, and only 184 were approved.45 
Though the Michigan and Florida statistics suggest only small numbers of minors 
seek judicial bypasses, these court determinations have a profound impact on the lives of 
pregnant minors.  Poverty is associated with teen parenting, either as a marker of poverty, 
 
40 THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/connecticut.html 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2006); THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/hawaii.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2006); THE ALAN 
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/new_york.html (last visited Aug. 
29, 2006); THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/oregon.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2006); THE ALAN 
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/vermont.html (last visited Aug. 
29, 2006); THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/washington.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2006). These states 
include Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. 
41 Emily Buss, Article, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 787 (2000). 
42 Adam Liptak, On Moral Grounds, Some Judges Are Opting Out of Abortion Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4. 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/national/04 
recuse.html?ex=1146110400&en=ee4519b0fd36675e&ei=5070. 
43 MARAL, PRO-CHOICE MICHIGAN, http://www.prochoicemichigan.org/s01takeaction/ 
200307281.shtml (last visited May 4, 2006). 
44 Id.
45 Mary Ellen Klas, Abortion Rules Challenged, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 23, 2006, at 4B. 
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or a cause of poverty.46 Raising a child may interfere with the ability to pursue 
education47 and develop job skills,48 preventing minor parents from improving their lives 
and the lives of their children.  Moreover, studies have shown that minor parents are 
more likely to receive welfare, have less family income, and abuse their children.49 Due 
to these significant risks of teenage parenting, judicial bypass proceedings should 
evaluate a minor’s maturity and circumstances without bias from the court.  As will be 
seen, however, because “maturity” is a subjective determination and no clear standard 
exists to evaluate maturity, judges are able to impose their personal beliefs on minors 
seeking abortions.  The danger of judicial bias, permitted through the unworkable 
definition of “maturity,” must be eliminated from judicial bypass proceedings to protect 
the reproductive choices of pregnant minors.     
B. The Subjectivity of “Maturity” and Judicial Bias
State courts have measured “maturity” in a variety of ways.50 In evaluating a 
pregnant minor’s maturity, courts have examined factors such as the minor’s age,51 
academic performance,52 intellectual capacity,53 participation in extracurricular activities 
at school,54 plans for the future,55 and the ability to handle her own finances.56 In 
 
46 See Kristen Luker, Note, Dubious Conceptions: The Politics of Teenage Pregnancy, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 963, 963 (2002).  
47 Jennifer Soper, Straddling the Line: Adolescent Pregnancy and Questions of Capacity, 23 LAW 
& PSYCHOL. REV. 195, 212-13 (1999) (noting the likelihood of pregnant teens to drop out of high 
school). 
48 Buss, supra note 41 at 787. 
49 See Luker, supra note 46 at 51. 
50 Stephen P. Rosenberg, Note, Splitting the Baby: When Can a Pregnant Minor Obtain an 
Abortion Without Parental Consent?  The Ex Parte Anonymous Cases (Alabama 2001), 34 CONN.
L. REV. 1109, 1117 (2002). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1118. 
55 Id.  
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essence, judges have been forced to develop their own criteria for evaluating maturity 
since the Supreme Court has never provided a specific standard.  On the contrary, in 
Bellotti the Court recognized that maturity is “difficult to define, let alone determine . . . 
The peculiar nature of the abortion decision requires the opportunity for case-by-case 
evaluations of the maturity of pregnant minors.” 57 Of the states using the judicial bypass 
process, none have provided judges with any practical guidance in evaluating 
“maturity.”58 In fact, when petitioned by a minor to obtain a judicial bypass, one 
Tennessee judge had “no clue” that minors could seek a judicial waiver to obtain an 
abortion.59 
Requiring judges to evaluate the maturity of pregnant minors without 
specific evaluation criteria poses a significant danger of judicial bias.60 Since the 
evaluation is left to the “unfettered discretion” of each judge, a trial judge may 
deny a petition for the following erroneous reasons: personal religious beliefs;61 
the judge is “improperly influenced” by the minor’s race, ethnicity, or social 
class;62 the judge cannot understand the minor’s reasoning due to a generational 
gap or differences in gender;63 or the judge might inappropriately slip into the role 
of “substitute parent” as opposed to remaining objective.64 
56 Id. 
57 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644. 
58 Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental Consent 
to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH J. GENDER & L. 75, 113 (1995). 
59 ABOUT.COM, http://atheism.about.com/b/a/179626.htm (last visited May 2, 2006). 
60 Scarnecchia, supra note 58 at 113. 
61 Id. at 87. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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Some judges in Tennessee, Alabama, and Pennsylvania have realized their 
personal biases, and have refused on religious and moral grounds to hear minors’ 
petitions seeking judicial waivers.65 At least one judge has also cited political 
pressure as another factor in deciding to grant minors’ judicial bypass petitions.66 
Although biased judges may impose their beliefs on minors seeking abortions, the 
other danger is that allowing judges to recuse themselves in all such cases means 
that no judge may be available in a minor’s county to hear her petition.  For 
example, in Tennessee’s Shelby Circuit Court, only four of the nine judges on the 
court currently hear abortion applications.67 In Boston in 1992, only two judges 
out of fifteen were hearing judicial bypass petitions.68 
C. Recommended Guidelines to Avoid Judicial Bias
Due to the serious risks of bias or abuse by trial courts, Professors Suellyn 
Scarnecchia and Julie Kunce Field have proposed specific guidelines for judges to 
use in determining whether a minor is sufficiently mature to make the decision 
herself to obtain an abortion.69 Some of their suggestions include presuming 
minors aged sixteen and above to be sufficiently mature to obtain judicial 
waiver,70 or presuming that an abortion is always in the best interests of a minor 
who is under the age of thirteen due to serious health risks associated with 
childbirth at that age.71 For minors aged thirteen through fifteen, Scarnecchia and 
 
65 Liptak, supra note 42. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Tamar Lewin, The Anguish of Asking a Court for an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1992, at 
B8. 
69 Scarnecchia, supra note 58 at 98-112. 
70 Id. at 111-112. 
71 Id. at 112. 
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Field have recommended using maturity factors that are probative of the minor’s 
ability to give informed consent to the abortion procedure.72 For example, the 
judge may ask minors about their plans to pay for the procedure and receipt of 
medical information from a licensed doctor or clinic, but not ask about their 
academic performance or general plans for the future.73 Scarnecchia and Field 
also maintain that on the issue of best interests, a judge should determine whether 
the minor might suffer physical or emotional harm if the judicial bypass is 
denied.74 
At least one legal commentator has embraced the recommendations set 
forth by Scarnecchia and Field.75 However, despite their detailed approach, the 
fact is that it may be nearly impossible for judges to evaluate a minor’s maturity 
without using some form of subjectivity.  Even developmental psychologists – 
specialists in the area of child development and child behavior – disagree as to 
whether minors are capable of “adult decision-making.”  Regarding medical 
treatment, some studies have suggested that adolescents have an “inability to 
anticipate future outcomes, to recognize possible risks of treatment.”76 Other 
studies have concluded that adolescents aged fourteen and above possess the 
requisite understanding and reasoning to make health care decisions, and that their 
decision-making processes resemble those of young adults.77 Much of the 
disagreement has focused on how to define competence: narrowly through the 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 122. 
74 Id. at 112. 
75 Rosenberg, supra note 50 at 1138-1139. 
76 See Wanda Franz & David Reardon, Differential Impact of Abortion on Adolescents and 
Adults, 27 Adolescence 161, 162-63 (1992). 
77 Id. 
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components of understanding and reason, or though the psychosocial factors that 
distinguish adolescents from adults,78 such as conformity and compliance in 
relation to peers and parents, their attitude toward and perception of risk, and 
temporal perspective.79 
Regardless of how development psychologists choose to define “maturity,” the 
fact that specialists in this area disagree leaves little hope for judges.  In the twenty-seven 
years since Bellotti first introduced the “maturity” prong of granting judicial waivers, 
judges still differ in their evaluations of petitions for judicial bypass.  According to one 
study, a judge presiding over a bypass proceeding may be “improperly influenced” by the 
minor’s race, ethnicity, or socio-economic background.80 Moreover, some judges 
themselves realize that judicial bypass proceedings cause fear, tension, anxiety, and 
shame among minors, causing some who are mature, and some whose best interests 
would be served by an abortion, to “forego the bypass option and either notify their 
parents or carry to term.”81 One study has also suggested that teenage girls from low-
income backgrounds who seek judicial waivers of parental consent may display an 
inaccurately lower level of moral maturity to the court or other evaluator.82 Thus, studies 
have shown not only that “maturity” may be incorrectly determined by a court, but that 
this false determination may disproportionately affect minors based on their socio-
economic class. 
 
78 See Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals 
Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 724-30 (1997). 
79 Franz, supra note 76 at 162. 
80 Betty Bardige et al., Moral Concerns and Considerations of Urban Youth, in MAPPING THE 
MORAL DOMAIN 159, 165 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988). 
81 Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 441. 
82 Bardige, supra note 80 at 165. 
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D. Poor Appellate Review of Judicial Bypass Proceedings
As the following case demonstrates, in evaluating maturity some judges may lend 
great weight to certain factors such as age and academic performance, and other courts 
may disregard those factors entirely in their maturity evaluations.  In re: Jane Doe 
illustrates the judicial bias involved in bypass proceedings, as well as the hesitancy of 
appellate courts to find error in trial court decisions despite their questionable 
reasoning.83 Recognizing that lower court judges are vested with discretion in evaluating 
maturity,84 a plurality of the Ohio Supreme Court held that the trial court was not 
unreasonable to base its finding of immaturity upon 1) the minor’s having had a prior 
abortion within the last year, and 2) having her two pregnancies result from sex with 
different men.85 As one legal commentator has noted, “[h]ow could [the minor’s] having 
had a prior abortion indicate that she was not well enough informed to make her own 
abortion decision, or that she lacked competence to assess the implications of this 
decision?”86 Rather, this would indicate that she was well informed of the abortion 
process from past personal experience, and that she was competent to assess its 
implications.87 To err is human and maturity does not necessarily protect against the 
repeating of mistakes.88 Seventy-eight percent of teen pregnancies in the U.S. are 
unplanned.89 Thus, if accidentally becoming pregnant were to connote immaturity, most 
judicial bypass petitions could be denied on that basis alone.   
 
83 In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1991). 
84 Id. at 1184. 
85 Id. 
86 Stuhlbarg, supra note 10 at 952. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 HENSHAW SK, UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES, FAMILY PLANNING 
Perspectives (1998). 
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Moreover, this author does not believe that someone’s number of sexual partners 
speaks to maturity or immaturity.  Rather, it is a lifestyle choice.  The number of sexual 
partners does not relate to a minor’s understanding of the abortion procedure, nor does it 
have anything to do with one’s medical assessment of having an abortion.  Here, the state 
court allowed a subjective belief about sexual morality to outweigh other factors in the 
minor’s situation.  The minor was a senior in high school, maintained a 3.0 grade point 
average, was involved in school sports, planned to attend college, and had held various 
part time jobs.  Although these factors have been used by other courts to find maturity,90 
the lower court in Jane Doe did not take these into consideration.  Most striking, the 
lower court gave no explanation as to why the factors it did choose demonstrated 
immaturity – and the Ohio Supreme Court found no reason to reverse the lower court’s 
decision even though it lacked any semblance of judicial reasoning.91 
III. REJECTING THE “MATURITY” STANDARD IN JUDICIAL BYPASS 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. Planned Parenthood v. Farmer
Though many courts have relied on the “maturity” requirement to determine 
whether or not to grant a minor’s judicial bypass petition, at least one state supreme court 
has struck down a parental notification statute as violative of the state’s equal protection 
clause.  In Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared the 
state’s parental notification law unconstitutional because it permitted minors to make 
health care decisions during pregnancy – including whether she would have a caesarean 
 
90 In re Doe, 2002 Ohio 3926 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); In re Doe, 2005 Ohio 1559 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005). 
91 In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d at 1184. 
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section – but not permit the same minor to terminate her pregnancy.92 Instead of focusing 
on a pregnant minor’s maturity, the court examined the harsh reality of burdens placed on 
minors who seek judicial waivers.93 The Farmer court found that even notifying parents 
placed financial and emotional burdens on minors which could prevent them from 
obtaining abortions:94 parental displeasure, withdrawal of financial support, or actual 
blocking of the abortion decision.95 The court also noted that minors encounter more 
time delays than older women because they often learn of their pregnancy later and need 
to have an abortion soon after this discovery; minors must overcome inexperience with 
the health care system; and minors lack the financial resources to easily acquire an 
abortion.96 According to the Farmer court, these delays harm minors due to the increase 
of medical complications in later abortions, as well as because the cost of an abortion 
increases the longer a minor waits and could become too expensive.97 Moreover, the 
court held that judicial bypass procedures exacerbate these delays because minors must 
seek legal representation and miss school to appear in court without her parents’ 
knowledge.98 Thus, competing state interests to restrict minors’ access to abortions were 
not justified.99 
In looking beyond the “maturity” requirement, the Farmer court examined the life 
circumstances of minors in their totality.  This author believes that in doing so, the New 
 
92 Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 638 (N.J. 2000). 
93 Id. at 635. 
94 Id. at 634-637. 
95 Id. at 634. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 635. 
99 Id. 
18
Jersey Supreme Court did what some courts have failed to do: operate in the best interest 
of the minor instead of trying to meet some vague notion of “maturity.”  
B. “Maturity” Has Been Rejected as a Requirement in Other Major Life Decisions 
For Minors
Unfortunately, most courts do not appear to take the reality-based approach 
reflected in the Farmer decision.100 Instead, most courts continue to hold on to the 
outmoded presumptions of juvenile immaturity.  Proponents of parental consent and 
notification statutes justify such laws on the ground that the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy is less a medical choice than a major life decision, and minors are too 
immature to make such choices.101 Since an abortion may have long-term impacts on a 
woman’s psychological and emotional well-being, advocates of parental involvement 
maintain that parental guidance becomes especially important for minors.102 However, 
many states allow minors to make other decisions which may have a similar effect on 
their lives.  Many states allow pregnant minors to consent to medical treatment for their 
pregnancy.103 The Supreme Court has rendered unconstitutional statutes which prohibit 
the distribution of non-medical contraceptives to minors.104 Many states have enacted 
statutes that allow minors to obtain treatment for sexually transmitted diseases without 
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parental consent or knowledge.105 And these barriers for minors seeking abortions 
indicate that state legislatures believe a minor is mature enough to have a baby.   
Most striking, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia explicitly permit a 
minor mother to place her child up for adoption without her own parents’ permission or 
knowledge.106 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia currently have laws that 
authorize a minor parent to consent to medical care for his or her child.107 The Supreme 
Court has on multiple occasions upheld the fundamental right to parent,108 and that 
parents possess an implicit constitutional right to freedom from state intervention in 
family matters.109 Perhaps due to this tradition of “right to parent,” no state restricts the 
parental rights of minors over their children.  A state will only intervene in cases where it 
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is not in the best interest of the minor’s child for the minor parent to retain custody and 
control of the child.110 
Arguably, placing a child up for adoption or seeking medical care for one’s child 
requires a parent to possess “maturity.”  Some commentators have held that since minors 
have a near absolute right to parent, it is illogical to prevent minors from obtaining 
abortions due to lack of maturity.111 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he law operates 
under the mistaken notion that even though a minor may be too immature to have an 
abortion, she is mature enough to make major medical decisions related to her pregnancy 
and subsequently to make decisions regarding the upbringing of her child."112 At least 
one commentator has suggested the opposite, that minors’ parental rights should be 
limited because their autonomy is restricted in other areas due to their status as a 
minor.113 However, this author believes strongly that if courts are not willing to grant 
minors access to abortions in all cases, the minors should at least be able to assert their 
full rights as parents.  Otherwise courts would in essence be forcing minors to have 
children and then dictating the way in which those minors raised their children.  If states 
are concerned about the ability of minors to parent, then they should allow minors the 
choice to seek abortions without parental involvement.    
Regardless of position one takes on minors being able to obtain abortions, using 
“maturity” as a determining factor in a judicial bypass proceeding creates a legal 
environment where judges do not have to justify their reasoning for rejecting a minor’s 
judicial bypass petition.  Thus, judges may interject their personal biases in their 
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decisions.  The State of Florida is considering legislation which would require pregnant 
minors to petition courts closer to home to prevent minors from “forum shopping” for 
more lenient judges within the state.114 Under current Florida law, minors may go to any 
judge within one of the five district courts of appeal in the state.115 Though backers of 
this idea desire to make it more difficult for minors to obtain abortions, these proponents 
are acknowledging the disparity of court outcomes in evaluating minor’s petitions: some 
judges are known for being more lenient.  Ultimately, judges have too much discretion to 
evaluate “maturity,” and the inconsistency of outcomes promotes a very subjective sense 
of justice. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The choice to become a parent, to give a baby up for adoption, or to terminate a 
pregnancy presents a life-altering decision for a minor.  The majority of states require 
minors to engage their parents or legal guardians in their choice to obtain an abortion, but 
not in decisions to give their babies up for adoption or to become parents.  Though the 
Supreme Court has held that parental consent and notification laws do not infringe on a 
minor’s constitutional rights if judicial bypass options are available, the reality of these 
judicial proceedings demonstrates a biased and unworkable legal avenue.  Even the 
Supreme Court acknowledges the difficulty in measuring “maturity,” but has continued to 
affirm “maturity” as the standard judges should use when evaluating minor’s petitions.   
Consequently, judges’ decisions are left largely to their own discretion and have 
resulted in inconsistent determinations of “maturity.”  Due to the significant risk of 
 
114 Klas, supra note 45. 
115 Id. 
22
poverty and child abuse associated with teenage parenting, judicial bypass proceedings 
should be objective and look out for the best of the minor.  Not only must minors 
navigate the cumbersome process of appearing before a judge to obtain a judicial waiver, 
they may encounter a judge whose personal beliefs have sealed their fate before they 
have even had their day in court.  Thus, the danger of judicial bias, permitted through the 
unworkable definition of “maturity,” must be eliminated from judicial bypass 
proceedings to protect the reproductive choices of pregnant minors.     
